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Admiralty
by John P. Kavanagh, Jr.
The cases discussed herein represent decisions the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued in 2018 and 2019.
While not an all-inclusive list of maritime decisions from the court
during that timeframe, the Author identified and provided summaries
of key cases which should be of interest to the maritime practitioner. 1
I. CRUISE LINE PASSENGER CLAIMS

1. Many of the decisions were not identified by the court for publication. However,
the West National Reporter System "publishes" these nonpublished opinions in the
Federal Appendix. Pursuant to Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
citation to an unpublished opinion is allowed. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1. Further, Eleventh
Circuit Rule 362 notes that, while not binding precedent, unpublished opinions "may be
cited as persuasive authority." 11th CIR. R. 36-2.
2. Caron v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 910 F.3d 1359, 1362 (11th Cir. 2018).
3. Id. at 1362–63.
4. Id. at 1363 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (2018) and § 1333(1) (2018)).
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"This case arises from a drunken tumble down an escape hatch on a
cruise ship."2 So begins the decision involving Plaintiff Olivier Caron's
personal injury, which occurred while Caron was a passenger on the
M/V STAR. Caron, a Canadian citizen, bought an all-inclusive package
allowing him to drink unlimited beer and wine while on his cruise.
During the early morning hours (3:37 a.m.) of July 16, 2015, Caron
descended to a midship area of the vessel and proceeded through a door
marked "CREW ONLY" into a restricted area. Two crewmembers tried
to stop him, but Caron ran away when confronted. Caron then walked
through another door marked "CREW ONLY," where he fell into a hole,
which served as the escape hatch from the bowthruster room below. 3
The suit was originally filed asserting both diversity of citizenship
and admiralty jurisdiction.4 Caron's original complaint did not mention
anything about alcohol, instead made allegations premised on general
theories of negligence. Later, Caron amended his complaint adding an
allegation that the cruise line was negligent in overserving alcohol to
him. The district court granted a motion to dismiss this amended
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complaint (overserving alcohol) because it was time barred, filed outside
the one-year limitation period contained in the passenger ticket
contract.5
The cruise line moved for summary judgment and the district court
granted the same. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit addressed three
issues: (1) Whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction in the first
instance, (2) whether the negligent "over-service of alcohol" claim was
contractually barred or related back to the original filing, and (3)
whether or not summary judgment on the negligence claim was proper. 6
In an apparent case of first impression following the 2012 amendments
to the subject matter jurisdiction statutes, the appellate court held that
the district court did not have diversity jurisdiction for this suit filed by
Caron (a Canadian citizen) and NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., a Bermuda
corporation with its principal place of business in Florida. 7 The federal
diversity statute requires complete diversity; this is the case whether or
not the contest is between citizens of different U.S. states or suits
between two aliens (individuals or corporate entities). 8
Nonetheless, the appellate court agreed with Caron that alternative
subject matter jurisdiction did exist based on the federal court's
admiralty jurisdiction.9 The plaintiff's claim of a maritime tort sufficed
to invoke the court's jurisdiction in that regard. 10
Having resolved the threshold jurisdiction issues, the court turned its
attention to the relation back of Caron's amended complaint. Caron's
attempt to amend his complaint and assert a negligent "over-service of
alcohol" claim was barred by the one-year limitation period contained in
the ticket contract.11 The original complaint made no mention of
alcohol, instead focused on the physical condition of the ship. 12 The
42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 6 Side B
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5. Id.
6. Id. at 1362.
7. Id. at 1364–65. The court referenced the 2012 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c),
which "explicitly impute[s] to corporations citizenship in every State or foreign state
where the company is incorporated and in the State or foreign state where the corporation
has its worldwide principal place of business . . . . So a corporation incorporated in a
foreign state is specifically deemed a citizen of the foreign state when evaluating
jurisdiction." Id. at 1365.
8. Id. at 1364.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1).
10. Caron, 910 F.3d at 1365–66.
11. Id. at 1367.
12. Id. at 1368.
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court held that relation back under Rule 15 did not salvage the
otherwise tardy amendment.13
Finally, turning to the substance of the negligence action, the
appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to grant summary
judgment in favor of the cruise line. Caron failed to present any
evidence that the opening in which he fell down was unreasonably
dangerous, or—assuming that the hatch did present a dangerous
condition—that NCL had notice of the same.14
The decision in Davis v. Valsamis,15 involved claims brought by
passengers on an infamous cruise aboard the CARNIVAL TRIUMPH.
While underway in the Gulf of Mexico, a fire in the ship's engine room
disabled the vessel. Hotel services and the expected accoutrements of a
comfortable voyage (functioning toilets, air conditioning) simply stopped
working.16 The conditions continued to deteriorate causing much
distress and discomfort among those aboard, including 100 passengers
who filed the instant lawsuit against Valsamis, Inc. (Valsamis), the
contractor hired by Carnival to maintain the ship's engines and
appurtenant equipment.17
The trial court granted summary judgment, and the decision was
affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit. The matter turned on one of
contractual interpretation, again with reference to the limitations found
in the passenger ticket contract. Like most cruise tickets, Carnival's
passenger ticket contract requires putative claimants to notify Carnival
of any injury, illness or death within 185 days after the date of the
injury, illness or death.18 Suit must be filed within one year after the
conclusion of the cruise.19 Of particular interest in this case is a
"Himalaya Clause," which extended Carnival's rights—including the
42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 7 Side A
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13. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B), which allows an amended complaint to relate back to
the original filing if it "asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original pleading."
Caron, 910 F.3d at 1368 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. (15(c)(1)(B)).
14. Caron, 910 F.3d at 1369–70.
15. 752 F. App'x 688 (11th Cir. 2018).
16. Id. at 689. Hence, the headline grabbing nickname "Poop Cruise" given to the
unfortunate voyage. See, e.g., Drew Griffin & Scott Bronstein, Carnival knew of fire
danger
before
cruise
documents
show,
CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2013/12/17/travel/carnival-cruise-triumph-problems/index.html (last
visited Mar. 20, 2020).
17. Davis, 752 F. App'x at 689–90.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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notice requirement—to other potential defendants. 20 The Himalaya
Clause in the present case extended rights, including exemptions from
liability, defenses and immunities otherwise available to Carnival, to its
suppliers, ship builders, manufacturers of component parts and
independent contractors. 21 The court held that Valsamis clearly fell
within the scope and reach of the clause, and was thus was entitled to
the protections contained in the passenger ticket contract. 22
The dispositive question, however, was whether or not notice of
claims against Valsamis had to be given in the 185-day notice period.
Any claim for which Carnival had not received notice in such window
would be barred. Plaintiffs argued the requisite notice period for
Carnival should not be extended to its independent contractor,
Valsamis.23 Reviewing the contract as a whole, the Eleventh Circuit
rejected this position and held that the Himalaya Clause granted
Valsamis the same rights—and imposed the same notice periods—as
held by Carnival: "The specific recitation in the Himalaya Clause that
Defendant shall have all of Carnival's rights and shall not have any
liability different from that of Carnival renders unreasonable any
interpretation of the notice provision that holds Defendant liable
without receiving notice of Plaintiffs' claims within the allotted time." 24
In Eslinger v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc.,25 the appellate court affirmed
the district court's order dismissing a spouse's claim for loss of
consortium. Derek Eslinger was injured while aboard the cruise ship
EQUINOX, a vessel owned and operated by Celebrity Cruises, Inc. 26 His
wife Tara asserted her own claim for loss of consortium ("deprivation of
the affection, solace, care, comfort, companionship, conjugal life,
fellowship, society, and assurance of her husband that resulted from his
42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 7 Side B
05/29/2020 07:30:56

20. Id. "Himalaya Clauses extend liability limitations to downstream parties and
take their name from an English case involving a steamship called Himalaya." Davis, 752
F. App'x at 690 n.1 (citing Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 20 n.2 (2004)).
Himalaya Clauses are normally found in cases involving cargo claims, extrapolated from
the bill of lading covering the shipment of goods. See, e.g., Robert Koets, et al., "Extension
of Limitation of Liability to Third Parties; 'Himalaya Clauses," 80 C.S.J. SHIPPING § 333
(February 2020 update).
21. Davis, 752 F. App'x at 689.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 691.
24. Id. at 695. Interestingly, the court observed that there was no evidence in the
record that the plaintiffs actually provided notice to Carnival, either, within the 185-day
time period. Id. at 695 n.4.
25. 772 F. App'x 872 (11th Cir. 2019).
26. Id. at 872.
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injury").27 The district court dismissed Mrs. Eslinger's claim, and the
appellate court affirmed.28 Citing In re Amtrak Sunset Ltd. Train Crash
in Bayou Canot, Alabama.,29 along with a Jones Act case, 30 the
Eleventh Circuit held that plaintiffs may not recover "punitive damages
[sic], including loss of consortium damages, for personal injury claims
under federal maritime law."31
The court was unpersuaded that the intervening decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Atlantic Sounding Co. v.
Townsend32 required a different result.33 The Eleventh Circuit felt that
Atlantic Sounding was inapplicable because it did not apply to loss of
consortium claims; further, the appellate court noted that Eslinger
failed to explain "why passenger spouses, but not those of seamen,
should be permitted to recover for loss of consortium." 34
The decision in K.T. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.,35 involved
claims arising from criminal activity of third parties aboard a cruise
ship. The minor plaintiff (K.T.) alleged that she was sexually assaulted
after being plied with alcohol by a group of adult men aboard a Royal
Caribbean vessel. Her lawsuit included various causes of action,
including—for present purposes—(1) a claim based on negligent failure
to warn, and (2) negligent failure to prevent such assaults in the first
place.36
The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.37 The Eleventh Circuit reversed.38
The opinion is unique for the fact that Chief Judge Ed Carnes not only
wrote the opinion, but he also issued a special concurrence. More on
that later.
42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 8 Side A
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27. Id.
28. Id. at 872–873.
29. 121 F.3d 1421, 1429 (11th Cir. 1997).
30. Lollie v. Brown Marine Serv., Inc., 995 F.2d 1565, 1565 (11th Cir. 1993).
31. Eslinger, 772 F. App'x at 872. This might be a typo, with the proper nomenclature
being "nonpecuniary" not "punitive" damages.
32. 557 U.S. 404 (2009).
33. See Eslinger, 772 F. App'x at 873. In Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, the
Supreme Court held that the general maritime law allowed a seaman to pursue punitive
damage claims—a species of nonpecuniary damages—for his/her employer's willful and
wanton disregard of a maintain and secure obligation. Atlantic Sounding Co., 557 U.S. at
424.
34. Eslinger, 772 F. App'x at 873.
35. 931 F.3d 1041 (2019).
36. K.T, 931 F.3d at 1043.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1047.

42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 8 Side B

05/29/2020 07:30:56

[1] ADMIRALTY CP (DO NOT DELETE)

918

MERCER LAW REVIEW

5/20/2020 8:27 AM

[Vol. 71

The standard of review in appealing an order dismissing suit via a
Rule 1239 motion is fairly lenient; allegations in the complaint are
accepted as true, and the court reviews de novo the decision of the trial
judge.40 The complaint stated that the cruise line had knowledge (actual
or constructive) of sexual assaults, as well as other acts of violence
between passengers and crew. This included sexual assaults on minors,
which was claimed to be a foreseeable and known danger to Royal
Caribbean.41 "And that foreseeable and known danger imposed on Royal
Caribbean and its crew a duty of ordinary reasonable care, which
included the duty to monitor and regulate the behavior of its
passengers, especially where minors are involved."42
The second theory of negligence (failure to warn) was held to be
sufficiently stated to pass muster under the pleading standards. 43
Failure to warn arises from foreseeability of a known danger.44 Citing
the fact that cruise lines warn passengers about anticipated dangers in
shore-based excursion, the appellate court stated that, "a cruise line
certainly owes its passengers a 'duty to warn of known dangers' aboard
its ship."45
The complaint was sufficiently plead to allege that Royal Caribbean
knew or should have known about the dangers of sexual assault aboard
its vessels. The allegations demonstrated notice and knowledge
sufficient to survive a 12(b)(6) motion.46
Chief Judge Carnes wrote an additional concurrence citing to
published reports (Cruise Line Incident Reports)—now required under
federal law—outlining the number of complaints about criminal activity
aboard cruise vessels.47

05/29/2020 07:30:56

39. FED. R. CIV. P. 12.
40. Id. at 1043.
41. Id. at 1044–45.
42. Id. at 1045.
43. Id. at 1046.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1046 (quoting Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318, 1322 (11th
Cir. 1989)).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1047 (citing 46 U.S.C. § 3507 (Cruise Line Incident Reports)).
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All of this data supplements the allegations contained in the
complaint and reinforces the conclusion that the complaint states a
valid claim and adequately pleads that, among other things, Royal
Caribbean knew or should have known that there was a serious
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problem of violent crime, including passenger-on-passenger sexual
assaults, on cruise ships including its own.48

48. Id. at 1049.
49. 789 F. App'x 196 (11th Cir. 2019).
50. Id. at 198. The reader is left to assume

that Lebedinsky is from New York,
although it is not stated in the opinion. What is abundantly clear, however, is that
the MSC MUSICA never called at any U.S. port during the subject cruise.

05/29/2020 07:30:56

51. Id. at 199 (quoting referenced portions of the cruise line's "Booking Terms and
Conditions" as cited and referenced on the district court's docket).
52. Id. at 198.
53. Id.
54. Id. (citing the Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and
Their Luggage by Sea, art. 7, Nov. 19, 1976, 1463 U.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter The Athens
Convention]).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 199.

42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 9 Side A

The Eleventh Circuit continues to uphold forum selection clauses in
passenger ticket contracts, including those directing claimants to
foreign venues. In Lebedinsky v. MSC Cruises, S.A.,49 a passenger was
required to pursue her personal injury claim in Italy. The MSC
MUSICA embarked on a European cruise from Venice, Italy with
intermediate stops in Italy, Greece and Montenegro. Unfortunately, Ms.
Tanya Lebedinsky fell aboard the ship and was disembarked to an
Italian hospital before being flown to New York for further treatment.50
The ticket and passenger contract documents contained a forum
selection clause: "for Voyages that do not include a port in the U.S.A.,
all claims arising out of this Contract or relating to or arising from this
Contract or your cruise shall be brought in and be subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of Naples, Italy." 51
Lebedinsky did not dispute receipt of the booking documents, but she
did not recall reviewing them before her trip.52 The documents directed
passengers to the cruise line's website where complete terms and
conditions of the passenger contract (including the "Applicable Law"
section containing the forum selection clause) were located. 53 The
contract also incorporated by reference the Athens Convention, an
international treaty governing the carriage by sea of passengers and
their luggage.54 The Athens Convention contains a limitation on
liability for passengers' personal injury claims. 55
Lebedinsky filed suit in the Southern District of Florida, and MSC
Cruises moved to dismiss for improper venue and on forum non
conveniens grounds. The district court granted the motion, concluding
that the forum selection clause required claims to be filed in Italy. 56 The
Eleventh Circuit began its analysis by noting that "[f]orum selection
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57. Id. at 200 (quoting, inter alia, Krenkel v. Kerzner Int'l Hotels Ltd., 579 F.3d 1279,
1281 (11th Cir. 2009)).
58. Id. (internal citations omitted).
59. Id. at 200.
60. Id. at 200–201.
61. Id. at 201.
62. Id. at 202 (noting that the claimed inconvenience requires a "heavy burden of
proof" to render a forum selection clause unenforceable).
63. Id.

42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 9 Side B

clauses are presumptively valid and enforceable unless the plaintiff
makes a 'strong showing' that enforcement would be unfair or
unreasonable under the circumstances." 57 The framework for showing
that enforcement of a forum selection clause is unfair or unreasonable
is generally limited to four arguments: (1) formation of the contract
induced by fraud or overreaching; (2) depriving the plaintiff of her day
in court because of inconvenience or unfairness; (3) the chosen law
would deprive the plaintiff of a remedy; or (4) enforcement of the clause
contravenes public policy.58
The district court evaluated these four avenues and rejected each, in
turn. Fraud or overreaching is evaluated by assessing whether the
terms and conditions were reasonably communicated to the passenger.
This includes reviewing the clause's physical characteristics, and
whether the plaintiff had the ability to become "meaningfully informed
of the clause and to reject its terms."59 Interestingly, the court observed
that the forum selection language was set out in identical type as the
rest of the terms and conditions, but did fall under a "clear
plain-English heading[]."60 This sufficed for the physical characteristic
prong of the test. Further, the clause was deemed to have been
reasonably communicated to Lebedinsky because both she and her
travel agent were given the booking confirmation with notice regarding
the applicable terms and conditions in advance of the trip. 61 The
language was unambiguous, and clearly stated that claims arising out
of the voyage were to be brought in Italy.
Turning to the argument that the forum selection clause would
deprive plaintiff of her day in court, the court rejected Lebedinsky's
argument based on inconvenience associated with travel to Italy. 62 The
court reiterated the fact that the MSC MUSICA did not travel to any
United States port of call; the trip began and ended in Italy with stops
in European ports. It was not unreasonable nor unanticipated that
disputes, including claims for injuries sustained during the voyage,
would be litigated in an Italian forum.63
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Turning to the argument that foreign law would deprive Ms.
Lebedinsky of a remedy, the court disagreed that the application of the
Athens Convention would effectively deprive her of proper recourse.64
The Athens Convention limits damages for personal injury claims to
$750,000. This limitation on possible recovery is not so inadequate that
enforcement would be fundamentally unfair. 65 Reiterating that "the
potential for decreased recovery is not the same as no remedy," the
Eleventh Circuit held that the possibility of reduced recovery did not
amount to fundamental unfairness nor did it render the forum selection
clause invalid.66
Finally, application of the Athens Convention would not contravene
U.S. law, which prohibits a carrier from imposing limits on passenger
liability for its negligence.67 This public policy argument had been
specifically rejected in prior Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence.68
Because the forum selection clause "was not induced by fraud or
overreaching, [and] would not deprive Lebedinsky of her day in court
nor leave her without a remedy, and" the enforcement of the clause did
not contravene public policy, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
summary disposition of her claim based on the cruise lines forum
selection clause.69
II. SHIPOWNER'S LIMITATION OF LIABILITY

05/29/2020 07:30:56

64. Id.
65. Id. at 203.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 203 (citing 46 U.S.C.§ 30509).
68. Id. (citing Estate of Myhra v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1233,
1242–43 (11th Cir. 2012), superseded on other grounds as recognized by Caron v. NCL
(Bahamas) Ltd., 910 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2018)).
69. Id. at 203–04.
70. 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501–30512 (2012).
71. Orion Marine Constr., Inc. v. Carroll, 918 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2019).
72. Id. at 1325.
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In a decision that your Author is not sure he completely understands,
the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the six-month filing deadline in the
Shipowner's Limitation of Liability Act 70 is not jurisdictional when it
held that failure to file a limitation petition within six months from
receiving written notice of a claim does not deprive the federal court of
subject matter jurisdiction.71 The statutory time limit is, instead, "a
non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule."72
Orion is a marine construction company engaged by the Florida
Department of Transportation (FDOT) to rebuild the Pinellas Bayway
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73. Id. at 1325–28.
74. 46 U.S.C. § 30511(a).

The Act permits a vessel owner to limit its exposure
for potential liability to the "value of the vessel and pending freight," following a
marine casualty. Id. § 30505(a). Limitation will be allowed only if the vessel
owner demonstrates that the loss was occasioned without any "privity or
knowledge of the owner" in bringing about the loss. Id. § 30505(b).

05/29/2020 07:30:56

75. Orion Marine Constr., Inc., 918 F.3d at 1328 (citing In re Eckstein Marine Serv.,
L.L.C., 672 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2012); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Abel, 533 F.2d 1001
(6th Cir. 1976)).
76. Id. at 1328 (citing Sec'y, United States Dep't of Labor v. Preston, 873 F.3d 877,
881–82 (11th Cir. 2007)).
77. 136 S. Ct. 709 (2016).
78. Orion Marine Constr., Inc., 918 F.3d at 1328 (quoting Preston, 873 F.3d at 881).
79. Id.

42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 10 Side B

Bridge in Pinellas County, Florida. This work required Orion to drive
hundreds of piles into the seabed. Local residents complained that the
pile driving caused damage to their property. After being notified of
several such claims, Orion filed a limitation of liability action on May
11, 2015. However, more than six months before this filing—namely,
before November 11, 2014—nine claimants had already notified Orion,
FDOT or Orion's insurer of potential claims involving damage to
property. After the November 11, 2014, filing, claims flooded in thanks
to the diligent work of a public adjuster. The court noted that 247
claims were eventually filed in the limitation action. The district court
dismissed Orion's limitation action, holding that it was untimely since
Orion filed the petition more than six months after receiving written
notice of a claim.73
The Shipowner's Limitation of Liability Act states, in pertinent part:
"[t]he owner of a vessel may bring a civil action in a district court of the
United States for limitation of liability under this chapter. The action
must be brought within 6 months after a claimant gives the owner
written notice of a claim."74 The Eleventh Circuit began its
jurisdictional analysis by noting that at least two circuits have held
that the six-month time bar constitutes a "jurisdictional limitation."75
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, citing intervening circuit precedent
outlining the distinctions between "true jurisdictional limitations and
non-jurisdictional 'claim-processing' rules . . . . "76 Distilling the import
from the Supreme Court's decision in Musacchio v. United States,77 the
Eleventh Circuit surmised that the high court intended "to impose some
discipline on the previously slippery use of the term 'jurisdictional.'" 78
The upshot of this instruction is that statutory periods should be
treated as jurisdictional only if clearly intended by Congress. 79 For
purposes of the Shipowner's Limitation of Liability Act, the appellate
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80. Id.
81. Id. at 1328–29.
82. Id. at 1329.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1330.
85. Id. at 1331–32.
86. Id. at 1331.
87. Id. at 1336–37. The Court reviewed the "early" claims (i.e., those received by
Orion before November 11, 2014), and concluded they did not reveal a reasonable
possibility that the claims would exceed the value of Orion's barges. Id. at 1334–35.

42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 11 Side A

court in Orion Marine held that the six-month filing period was not
jurisdictional because it did not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in
any way to the subject matter jurisdiction of a district court. 80 As such,
the language is insufficient, per the court, to plainly show that
Congress intended the deadline to carry with it jurisdictional
consequences.81 Finally, the court felt that the statutory context of the
six-month limitation period—placed within a discussion about the
"mechanics of shipowner suits"—belied any effort to imbue the section
with a jurisdictional limitation.82
The court then turned to a procedural discussion, having determined
that Orion's claim was not jurisdictionally barred by the absence of
subject matter jurisdiction.83 Procedurally, then, it was appropriate to
evaluate whether the nine original claims (sent to Orion before
November 11, 2014) provided sufficient notice to trigger the six-month
procedural timeframe within which to file a limitation petition. 84 In
turn, this prompted the Eleventh Circuit to finally decide what
standard should apply to determine the sufficiency of a "written notice
of a claim" for purposes of notice under the Limitation of Liability Act.
Identifying two competing tests, the court determined that notice is
sufficient if it informs the vessel owner of an actual or potential claim
that has a reasonable possibility of exceeding the value of the vessels
involved in the marine casualty.85 The court believed it was necessary
to include this "reasonable possibility" factor, lest a vessel owner be
forced to seek judicial protection at the first hint of any claim,
regardless of its value.86 Clarifying this requirement, the appellate
court further held that a vessel owner has a duty to investigate known
or potential claims once written notice is received which reveals the
reasonable possibility that the matter might exceed the value of the
vessels involved.87
Frankly, it is not clear to the undersigned why the Eleventh Circuit
felt compelled to engage in the first part of its analysis; specifically, the
setting up the juxtaposition of a jurisdictional versus procedural bar for
the six-month timeframe seems to be unnecessary. At bottom, the
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notices received by Orion were insufficient to start the six-month clock
regardless. Accordingly, the filing of the action was timely. The decision
seems to have created an unnecessary circuit split on the substantive
treatment of the six-month time limitation contained within the
statute.
III. MARINE INSURANCE

789 F. App'x 805 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 806.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 807.

Id.
Id. at 807–08.
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In Reliable Marine Towing and Salvage LLC v. Thomas,88 an
insurance case stemming from a salvage operation, John Thomas' boat
partially sank in a storm off the coast of Florida. Reliable Marine
Towing and Salvage LLC (Reliable Marine) provided services to rescue
the boat, enabling it to return to safe harbor. The vessel was insured by
State Farm, which eventually declared the boat to be a total loss. The
policy limit for hull insurance coverage was $6,750, and this amount
included wreck removal costs. The policy provided if the combined costs
of wreck removal and repairs exceeded $6,750, there was an additional
5% for wreck removal expenses ($337.50). Finally, the policy provided
an additional $500 for "emergency services."89
State Farm paid Thomas the policy limits for loss of his vessel
($6,750).90 Two weeks later, Reliable Marine sent an invoice to State
Farm for $3,109.84, reflecting charges for services rendered to its
insured.91 The insurance policy required State Farm to pay Thomas
directly unless another party was "legally entitled to receive
payment."92 Accordingly, State Farm sent Thomas the check for $837.50
(wreck removal contingency plus emergency services payment).
However, Thomas did not pay Reliable Marine. 93
Reliable Marine sued State Farm, claiming that it was a third-party
beneficiary under the insurance policy. The salvor also asserted a
separate claim against Thomas for salvage efforts. The district court
granted State Farm's summary judgment and dismissed Reliable
Marine's claims against it. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.94 It agreed
that State Farm knew Reliable Marine provided rescue services;
however, there was no evidence that Thomas assigned his right to the
insurance payment, and the plain language of the policy required State
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Farm to pay its insured absent legal duty to tender funds to a third
party.95
The court also rejected an argument that the policy contained a de
facto sue and labor clause.96 Sue and labor clauses in traditional marine
policies allow recovery of costs expended by an insured to safeguard and
recover the vessel and mitigate further loss. 97 The language of the State
Farm policy, however, did not warrant such an expansive
interpretation.98
IV. MARINE REPAIR CONTRACTS

05/29/2020 07:30:56

95. Id.
96. Id. at 808.
97. A true "sue and labor" clause would include a requirement that an insured must
"sue, labor and travel for, in and about the defense, safeguard and recovery of" the named
vessel. Reliable Marine Towing & Salvage, LLC, 789 F. App'x at 808 (quoting Reliance
Ins. Co. v. THE ESCAPADE, 280 F.2d 482, 484 n.4 (5th Cir. 1960)). In contrast, the State
Farm policy only required Mr. Thomas to "protect the property from further loss." Id.
98. Id. at 809.
99. 763 F. App'x 882 (11th Cir. 2019).
100. Id. at 883–84.
101. Id. at 884–85 (citing Diesel "Repower" Inc. v. Islander Invs. Ltd., 271 F.3d 1318
(11th Cir. 2001)).
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The validity and enforceability of a limitation clause in a contract to
repair a vessel was the subject of the decision in TriLady Marine, Ltd.
v. Bishop Mechanical Services, LLC.99 TriLady Marine, Ltd. owned the
yacht TRIUMPHANT LADY. Bishop Mechanical was hired to install a
compressor and chiller unit on the vessel. The contract included a
clause that limited Bishop Mechanical's liability for possible damages
arising from the work, and expressly excluded consequential damages.
The chiller unit failed, causing significant damage to the vessel. It was
discovered that the water hoses for the chiller unit had been plumbed in
reverse. The owners sought to recover for repairs to the vessel, as well
as loss of use, loss of charter income and other damages which would be
excluded by the repair contract. Bishop Mechanical moved for partial
summary judgment arguing that the limitation clause was enforceable,
and the district court agreed.100
In advancing its position on appeal, TriLady Marine, Ltd. argued
that (1) Bishop Mechanical waived the limitation clause because it was
not asserted as an affirmative defense, and (2) that the clause was
invalid under Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence. 101
The court rejected the waiver argument, pointing out that TriLady
Marine received notice of the defense "by some means other than
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pleadings" and had "a chance to rebut it." 102 Specifically, Bishop
Mechanical raised the defense in its motion for partial summary
judgment. TriLady Marine never objected or argued that it was
prejudiced by late notice of the defense. The appellate court held that
Bishop Mechanical was entitled to rely on the limitation clause as a
defense.103
With respect to the enforceability of the clause, the court noted the
general maritime law applies to vessel repair contracts and governs the
enforceability thereof.104 To be valid, the parties' intent must be clearly
and unequivocally stated, and the clause may not absolve the repair
company of all liability.105 The subject contract was between
sophisticated commercial entities and contained a limitation clause, but
did not impermissibly exculpate the repair company.106 The district
court's decision with respect to the enforceability of the clause was
affirmed.107
V. ARBITRATION OF SEAFARER'S CLAIMS

05/29/2020 07:30:56

102. Id. at 885 (quoting Grant v. Preferred Research, Inc., 885 F.2d 795, 797 (11th Cir.
1989).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 885–86.
105. Id. at 886 (citing Diesel "Repower" Inc., 271 F.3d at 1324).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. John P. Kavanagh, Jr., Admiralty, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 69 MERCER L. REV.
1001, 1003 (2018).
109. 941 F.3d 487 (11th Cir. 2019).
110. Id. at 504.
111. Id. at 491.
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As discussed in the last Eleventh Circuit Admiralty Survey, the
appellate court continues to routinely enforce arbitration clauses in
seafarers' contracts.108 In Cvoro v. Carnival Corporation,109 the court
affirmed the district court's decision regarding enforcement of a foreign
arbitral award.110 Sladjana Cvoro was employed as a waitress aboard
the Carnival DREAM, a Panamanian flagged vessel. Prior to
commencing service, Cvoro signed a seafarer's employment agreement
which contained both mandatory arbitration and forum selection
clauses. Disputes arising out of her employment were subject to
arbitration in one of several cities listed in the contract, whichever was
closer to her home country. The applicable law was the law of the ship's
flag (Panama).111 During her employment aboard the vessel, Cvoro
developed carpal tunnel syndrome which eventually prevented her from
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112. Id. at 490–91.
113. Id. at 491 (citing Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2018)).
114. Id. at 491–92.
115. Id. at 493.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. (citing Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, Dec. 29, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter The New York Convention]). See
generally, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208 (2018) (recognizing the New York Convention and
codifying its application and enforcement federally).
119. Cvoro, 941 F.3d at 495 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520
n.15 (1974)).
120. Id.
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performing her job functions as a waitress. She was repatriated to her
home country of Serbia where medical treatment went horribly wrong.
Cvoro was eventually left with severe motor deficits in her left hand
and wrist, a frozen shoulder, tendonitis of the wrist "and other
permanent problems with her left arm." 112
Cvoro commenced arbitration against Carnival in Monaco, the venue
closes to her home country of Serbia. She asserted claims based on U.S.
law, specifically the Jones Act. 113 Her contentions included that
Carnival was vicariously liable for the alleged malpractice of the
shoreside doctors. The arbitrator ignored Cvoro's requests that U.S. law
should apply and instead applied Panama law, the jurisprudence from
the flag state.114 Panamanian law does not recognize a claim based on
vicarious liability for the malpractice of shoreside doctors. 115 The final
award determined that Carnival satisfied its maintenance and secure
obligations, there was no basis for vicarious negligence of the physician
and Cvoro's tort-based claims failed because she did not establish
Carnival was negligent in any way.116
The proceedings moved to the U.S., where Cvoro filed suit in the
Southern District of Florida seeking to vacate the arbitral award and
deny enforcement thereof. She also sought to litigate the merits of her
Jones Act claim based on Carnival's vicarious liability for the medical
malpractice.117 Evaluation of the enforceability vel non of the arbitral
award turned on the application of the "Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards." 118 The stated purpose of
the New York Convention was to "encourage the recognition and
enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in international
contracts . . . . "119
In challenging the enforcement of an arbitral award, the petitioner
must successfully demonstrate the existence of at least one of the seven
enumerated defenses set out in the New York Convention.120 Of the
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seven defenses available, Cvoro invoked only one: that the enforcement
of the arbitral award would contravene the public policy of the United
States.121 This is a very narrow exception, and applies only when
confirmation or enforcement of foreign arbitral award would violate the
forum state's "basic notions of morality and justice."122
The Eleventh Circuit observed that it has not previously addressed
whether the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award involving against a
Jones Act seaman would suffice to trigger the public policy defense
under the New York Convention.123 The court turned to analogous
jurisprudence, also involving a Jones Act seaman's claim, albeit one "at
the
earlier
arbitration-enforcement
stage,"
versus
Cvoro's
award-enforcement challenge.124 Lindo was a Jones Act seaman injured
while working aboard an NCL vessel. Like Cvoro, Lindo signed a
seafarer's agreement containing an arbitration clause which directed
that his claim be decided in Nicaragua (the country where Lindo was a
citizen).125 Bahamian law would apply, as the law of the vessel's flag. 126
The district court granted a motion to compel arbitration, rejecting
Lindo's argument that doing so would violate U.S. as evinced by the
Jones Act and the admiralty courts' solicitude towards seaman. 127
Weighing the competing public policy issues—solicitude towards
seaman, promoting international arbitration of disputes, comity which
favors recognition of the arbitral award already entered in Monaco—the
Eleventh Circuit followed its precedent in Lindo and rejected Cvoro's
request to overturn her arbitral decision.128
VI. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Id.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 496.
Id. at 497 (citing Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2011)).

Id.
Id.
Id. at 497–98.
Id. at 500–01.
789 F. App'x 798 (11th Cir. 2019).
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125.
126.
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129.
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The Eleventh Circuit addressed a claim involving failure of the U.S.
Coast Guard to properly record a vessel mortgage in the decision
Evergreen Marine, Ltd. v. United States.129 Before purchasing a
sixty-foot yacht, Evergreen Marine contacted the United States Coast
Guard's National Vessel Documentation Center (NVDC) to assess
whether or not mortgages or liens existed on the vessel, and to obtain
the vessel's abstract of title. The NVDC reported there was no mortgage
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Id. at 799.
28 U.S.C. ch. 171, §§ 1346 (2018).
Evergreen Marine, Ltd., 789 F. App'x at 801.
Id. at 800.

Id.
Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2012)).
Id. at 799.
Id.
Id. at 800.

Id. (citing JBP Acquisitions, LP v. United States, 224 F.3d 1260, 1264
(11th Cir. 2000)).
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132.
133.
134.
135.
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139.
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or lien, and the purchase was completed relying on this information.
Three years later, Evergreen Marine received notice that M&T Bank
held an unsatisfied mortgage on the vessel, despite the clean title
previously reported by the NVDC. M&T Bank filed suit to foreclose on
the yacht in November 2015.130 Evergreen Marine eventually settled
this claim and filed a lawsuit, under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA),131 against the United States.132
A magistrate judge recommended dismissal of the case because the
FTCA does not waive sovereign immunity for claims based on
misrepresentation. The district court agreed, and this appeal
followed.133
The FTCA waives the United States' sovereign immunity in most tort
suits, but the statute is strictly construed. If an exception applies,
sovereign immunity is not waived and there is no subject matter
jurisdiction over the claim asserted. 134 In this case, sovereign immunity
did not apply because of an exception involving claims "arising out
of . . . misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights." 135
Evergreen Marine resisted this exception, arguing that its claims
sounded in negligence, based on the failure of the NVDC to properly
record the M&T Bank's ship mortgage. It appears that the paper
mortgage was not scanned into the electronic system when the NVDC
"migrated from a paper file system to an electronic system." 136 Based on
its review of the incorrect electronic system, the NVDC represented to
Evergreen Marine at the time of purchase no mortgage or lien was in
place. This, of course, turned out to be incorrect.137
The appellate court said that the plaintiff's selection of terminology
used was not dispositive.138 Rather, the court must consider the "true
'essence' of the plaintiff's claim, regardless of how the plaintiff may
have pled her cause."139 Evergreen's injuries were "based on the
communication or miscommunication of information upon which others
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might be expected to rely in economic matters." 140 Since Evergreen
Marine's claim, at bottom, involved a miscommunication, the appellate
court had no problem confirming that the exception applied and barred
suit against the United States.141
VII.MARITIME LIENS AND RELATED MATTERS

140. Id. at 802 (quoting Zelaya v. United States, 781 F.3d 1315, 1334 (11th Cir.
2015)).
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141. Id. at 801–02.
142. 891 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2018).
143. Id. at 1280.
144. Id. at 1282.
145. Id.
146. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) (2012), which allows for interlocutory appeals
from decisions "determining the rights and liabilities of the party to admiralty cases in
which appeals from final decrees are allowed").
147. Id.
148. Id. (internal citations omitted). This is codified in the Admiralty Extension Act,
46 U.S.C. § 30101(a) (2012).
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In a good primer on general maritime law lien rights, the Eleventh
Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's decision to deny a
motion to arrest a vessel in Minott v. M/Y BRUNELLO.142 Minott was a
repairman injured when attempting to board the yacht BRUNELLO.
Unfortunately, while crossing the gangway, the crew of the vessel
"suddenly and without warning" put the vessel in gear and pulled away.
Minott sustained injuries as a result of this act. A lawsuit was filed in
the Southern District of Florida; Minott included in personam claims, as
well as an in rem claim supported by a motion to arrest the M/Y
BRUNELLO. The district court denied the motion, concluding that a
maritime tort (plaintiff's personal injury claims) could not form the
basis for a maritime lien.143
The appellate court easily concluded it had interlocutory jurisdiction
over the appeal of this admiralty claim. The arrest or release of a vessel
impacts the a litigant's ability to enforce substantive maritime rights
(for example, liens).144 Should the vessel leave the jurisdiction, the
ability to effectuate lien rights could be lost. 145 Accordingly, jurisdiction
over the interlocutory appeal was proper.146
The court next walked through the fundamentals to establish a
maritime tort, which would carry with it maritime jurisdiction over the
claim. This consists of a dual inquiry: the location of the incident (situs)
and a nexus to maritime activity.147 The situs test is met even if the
injury occurs on land but is otherwise caused by a vessel in navigable
water.148 The nexus or connection element of this test calls for an
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149. Minott, 891 F.3d at 1282–83 (internal citations omitted).
150. Id. at 1283–84.
151. Id. at 1284.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1285 (noting that the district court looked to the Federal Maritime Lien
Act, 46 U.S.C. § 31342 which covers the provisions of necessaries to a vessel).
155. Id.
156. 733 F. App'x 503 (11th Cir. 2018).
157. Id. at 504–05.
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evaluation of the event's potential to disrupt maritime commerce. This
is often conflated with the "general character of the activity giving rise
to the incident," and whether it bears a substantial relationship to
traditional maritime activity.149
Here, the court had no trouble determining that the egress of
repairman onto a vessel in navigable waters clearly established
maritime tort jurisdiction, meeting both the potential disruption and
substantial relationship tests.150 Minott's injury affected the repair and
further operations of the vessel, which posed the potential to disrupt
the vessel's maritime activities.151 With respect to the general character
of the activity (namely, substantial relation to traditional maritime
activity), the court focused on the activities of the ostensible tortfeasor,
in this case the vessel itself. By engaging its engines and pulling away
from the dock, the vessel precipitated the accident. 152
The vessel, as an in rem defendant, is responsible for its torts. This
gives rise to lien rights in favor of the tort victim by operation of the
general maritime law.153 This is a well-settled principle, so it is
somewhat surprising the district court looked exclusively to statutory
guidance for assessing Minott's lien rights. 154 The appellate court
reversed and remanded with instructions for the district court to enter
an order directing the clerk to issue a warrant for the arrest of the
BRUNELLO.155
The decision rendered in Martin Energy Services, LLC v. M/V
BRAVANTE IX,156 is another case stemming from the OW Bunker
bankruptcy. Martin Energy Services, LLC (Martin) delivered fuel to the
M/V BRAVANTE VIII, a ship owned by Boldini Ltd. Boldini Ltd.
arranged to have fuel delivered to its ship by contacting an OW Bunker
affiliate who, in turn, ultimately engaged the physical supplier
(Martin). Martin delivered the fuel but was not paid. OW Bunker
subsequently filed for bankruptcy protection. 157
Seeking to recover the costs of fuel delivered ($286,200), Martin filed
an admiralty action asserting in personam claims against Boldini Ltd.
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VIII.MARITIME DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT
In a continuing line of cases discussing jurisdiction under the
Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA),163 the Eleventh Circuit

05/29/2020 07:30:56

158. Id. at 505.
159. Id. at 506.
160. Id.
161. Id. (internal citations omitted).
162. See Barcliff, LLC v. M/V Deep Blue, 876 F.3d 1063 (11th Cir. 2017), where the
court determined the physical supplier (Barcliff) was not entitled to a lien under the
Federal Maritime Lien Act, 46 U.S.C. § 31342, due to Barcliff's position at the end of the
buy-and-sell chain. See generally John P. Kavanagh, Jr., supra note 108, at 1016–18.
163. 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501–70508 (2018).
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for breach of contract and quantum meruit. Wanting to avoid paying
twice for the same fuel, Boldini Ltd. answered, and tendered funds into
the court's registry to cover the amount of fuel purchased. Boldini Ltd.
also named ING Bank as a cross-defendant; ING Bank was the lender
which held a security interest in the accounts receivable of certain OW
Bunker entities.158
The district court determined that Martin had a valid quantum
meruit claim under Florida law. Martin was awarded the fair value of
the fuel; ING was awarded that portion of the fund which OW Bunker
would have been entitled to recover as the "reseller" or "trader" of the
fuel ($3,900). Not satisfied, ING pursed an appeal. 159
The Eleventh Circuit noted the general maritime law would govern
this case, unless maritime jurisprudence did not provide specific
principles to answer the germane legal question. 160 In that case, it was
appropriate to turn to applicable state law. Under Florida law, a
quantum meruit claim allows a plaintiff to recover upon a showing that
it conferred a benefit to the defendant, which the defendant
acknowledged and accepted. Further, the circumstances are such that
equity requires the defendant pay the fair value of the benefit
supplied.161
Frankly, this was the absolute correct result. Martin (the physical
supplier) delivered fuel and was entitled to payment. ING, stepping into
the shoes of OW Bunker, should only be entitled to recover what OW
Bunker was going to receive at the end of the day (margin as reseller or
trader). This case is an excellent reminder to explore all potential
avenues of recovery for your client, looking outside the confines of
remedies available under maritime law when possible. For example, if a
maritime lien was pursued against the M/V BRAVANTE XI, it is likely
that Martin would not have prevailed on its claim. 162
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164. 891 F.3d 929 (11th Cir. 2018).
165. Id. at 932.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 932–34 (citing 46 U.S.C. § 70502(c)(1)(A) (2018)).
168. Id. at 933.
169. Id. at 931–32. This is relevant because the Coast Guard apparently did contact
Ecuadorian officials who were, unsurprisingly, unable to identify the registry of the
vessel. Id. at 932. The confusion was not clarified by the defendants/crewmen, who told
the Coast Guard that the painted ensign was the flag of Ecuador. Id. at 931.
170. Id. at 934.
171. Id. (quoting MDLEA, 46 U.S.C. § 70502(e)(2) (2018)).
172. Id. at 934.
173. Id. at 931 (internal citations omitted).
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in United States v. Obando,164 had occasion to discuss if a flag painted
on the side of a vessel is "flying."165 After stopping the vessel SIEMPRE
MALGARITA in international waters, personnel from the United States
Coast Guard boarded the boat and found a large cache of drugs.
Crewmembers aboard the vessel were arrested and later pled guilty to
various drug offenses, but reserved their right to challenge the
jurisdiction of the United States on appeal. 166
When stopped, the captain of the vessel could not produce documents
evidencing the vessel's nationality, nor did he verbally provide such
information. This is important, as the MDLEA grants the United States
extraterritorial jurisdiction over vessels without nationality (stateless
vessels).167 The act provides three exclusive methods for the master or
individual in charge of the vessel to stake a claim as to its nationality:
(1) possession of documents evidencing the same, (2) "flying its nation's
ensign or flag," or (3) a verbal claim of nationality.168 The SIEMPRE
MALGARITA had a Columbian flag painted on the side of its hull,
which is remarkably similar to the flag of Ecuador but without a very
distinct coat of arms in the center.169 On appeal, the defendants
contended that the painted flag on the side of the vessel sufficed to
demonstrate a claim of Columbian nationality. Thus, the appellants
argued, the Coast Guard was obligated to notify and seek boarding
permission from Columbian officials.170 "This argument fails if the
Colombian flag painted on the hull was not 'flying.'" 171
The court engages in an interesting analysis of maritime etiquette
and customs that—combined with the plain reading of the statute—
supports a finding that the word "flying" means what one thinks; that is
the flag or ensign must be hoisted and capable of freely moving in the
air.172 "Because a painted flag does not fly . . . we affirm."173
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IX. SEAMAN'S CLAIMS
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174. Jackson v. NCL America, LLC, 730 F. App'x 786, 791–92 (11th Cir. 2018).
175. Id. at 787–88.
176. Id. at 788.
177. Id. at 789 (quoting Everett v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 912 F.2d 1355, 1358 (11th
Cir. 1990)).
178. Id.
179. McCorpen v. Cent. Gulf Steamship Corp., 396 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1968).
180. Jackson, 730 F. App'x at 789 (citing McCorpen, 396 F.2d 547).
181. Id. (citing Brown v. Parker Drilling Offshore Corp., 410 F.3d 166, 171 (5th Cir.
2005)).
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In one of the few Jones Act cases decided during the survey period,
the Eleventh Circuit held that a seaman's failure to disclose preexisting
back injury did not foreclose her employer's maintenance and cure
obligations.174 Dorothy Jackson was employed by Norwegian Cruise
Lines (NCL) as a utility hand. The day before signing off her vessel,
Jackson slipped on an onion peel while walking in a corridor restricted
to crew access. Jackson disembarked the vessel and advised NCL that
she required medical treatment. NCL directed Jackson to coordinate
care with physicians in the NCL network. Jackson's lawyers, however,
directed her to other physicians who ultimately performed back
surgery.175
Suit was filed asserting claims of Jones Act negligence,
unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure. 176 After a bench trial, the
district court held that Jackson failed to present sufficient evidence on
her negligence claim. The established jurisprudence required that
Jackson present evidence that the vessel owner had "actual or
constructive notice of the risk-creating condition."177 The district court
concluded that Jackson presented no evidence that NCL had actual
knowledge of the onion peel and that circumstantial evidence, without
more, did not suffice to demonstrate that her employer knew of a
potentially dangerous condition. 178
The more significant issue involved NCL's appeal was that Jackson's
cure claim should fail because she did not disclose a preexisting back
injury. Under the case law developed post-McCorpen,179 a vessel owner
can be relieved of its cure obligations if an employee fails to disclose or
misrepresents a preexisting medical condition. 180 To avoid its
obligations, the employer must demonstrate (1) intentional
misrepresentation or concealment of medical facts, (2) the facts were
material to the hiring decision, and (3) a connection between the
withheld information and current injury. 181
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In this case, although Jackson's prior injury and the subject of her
current complaints involved her lower back, there was evidence of disc
herniation at different levels. 182 The court rejected NCL's position that
it was sufficient to show the injury and/or pain impacted the same body
part: "Although the two injuries do not have to be identical . . . simply
showing that Jackson's previous pain and her injury from the fall affect
the same body part without more specificity does not suffice." 183
The final charged error involved reimbursement amounts for medical
treatment. Because Jackson elected to use physicians of her own
choosing, as opposed to the network doctors provided by NCL, she was
only entitled to recover charges NCL would pay its network physicians.
NCL made repeated efforts to direct Jackson to its network physicians,
and informed her (and her lawyers) that any expense above the network
reimbursement rates would not be covered by NCL. 184 The court held
that the district court's determination on this point was not in error. 185
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182. Id. at 790.
183. Id. (citing Brown, 410 F.3d at 176–77).
184. Id. at 791.
185. Id.
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